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“CAPITAL” PUNISHMENT: EVALUATING AN INVESTOR’S 
SECONDARY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY AFTER 
VEOH 
 
James L. Proctor, Jr.*








In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
considered claims that investors in a privately-held corpor-
ation were secondarily liable for copyright infringement. The 
Veoh court findings, which set out current secondary copy-
right infringement law, provide guidance for investors by 
clarifying their potential liability for copyright infringement 
committed by the company in which they invested. However, 
because the decision was fact-specific, this guidance is 
incomplete. For example, the court found that the investor 
neither controlled the infringing activities nor reaped direct 
financial benefit from them. This leaves open for further 
decisions the situation in which only one factor is present. In 
addition, Veoh bases secondary liability on such subjective 
concepts as “control,” “supervision,” “ability to supervise,” 
“reason to know,” “material assistance,” “encouragement to 
infringe,” and “direct financial interest.” Therefore, future 
cases involving similar facts are susceptible to contrary 
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results based on the court’s interpretation of these concepts. 
This Article examines the standards established and the cases 
distinguished by the Veoh court to determine conditions 
under which an investor may be held liable for the copyright 
infringement of the investment target and proposes practical 
steps to minimize liability exposure. 
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With the rapid emergence of Internet-based technologies, 
investors increasingly seek guidance regarding potential secondary 
liability for copyright infringement. Penalties for secondary infringe-
ment can be high, ranging from an injunction against the infringing 
conduct to an award of damages. Attorney’s fees are routinely 
awarded to successful plaintiffs. Moreover, with respect to start-up 
companies, investors may have deeper pockets that claimants can 
pursue for recovery.  
Statutory coverage related to the rights of copyright holders is 
limited to protection against direct infringement.1
                                                                                                             
1 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006). 
 However, this lack 
of statutory coverage does not preclude the imposition of secondary 
2
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liability.2 To account for parties who indirectly benefit from 
copyright infringement, courts have developed concepts of secondary 
liability.3 Nevertheless, they have provided this guidance piecemeal, 
reflecting the challenge of maintaining the correct balance between 
copyright holders’ rights and the encouragement of commerce. As the 
Supreme Court noted in MGM v. Grokster, “the more artistic 
protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be 
discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in 
managing the tradeoff.”4
In February 2009, the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California provided some direction for investors in UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.
 
5 The federal district court 
considered claims of contributory, vicarious, and inducement liability 
against investors in an Internet company providing services used to 
infringe copyrights.6 The court, in dismissing the case, found, under 
the facts as pled, that the investor defendants did not exercise 
sufficient control over the infringing activity to be held liable for 
contributory infringement7 and lacked a sufficient financial interest 
tied to the infringement to be held liable for vicarious infringement.8
                                                                                                             
2 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 
(2010) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
435 (1984) (“The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does 
not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringement on certain parties 
who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity.”)).  
 
3 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913 (2005) (secondary liability found for inducement, encouragement and profiting 
from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (Active 
steps taken to encourage direct patent or copyright infringement incurs secondary 
liability); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(copyright infringement exists when one has knowledge of another’s infringement 
and either materially contributes to or induces the infringement). But see, e.g., Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc,, 464 U.S. 442 (1984) (no secondary 
liability for copyright infringement when the product provided is widely used for 
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes). 
4 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 928. 
5 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM, 2009 
WL 334022, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009). 
6 Id. at *1. 
7 Id. at *3. 
8 Id. at *6. 
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The court also found that the defendants did not encourage the direct 
infringement in a manner to be held liable for inducement to 
infringe.9
This Article examines Veoh’s analysis of investor liability in light 
of the then-existing state of secondary copyright infringement law, 
and provides practical suggestions for potential investors in com-




I. CONTRIBUTORY AND VICARIOUS COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
UNDER VEOH 
 
In September 2007, Universal Music Group, Inc. (“UMG”), a 
major record company, filed suit in federal court against Veoh 
Networks, Inc. (“Veoh”). In its initial complaint, UMG claimed that 
Veoh was liable for direct, contributory and vicarious copyright 
infringement, and for inducement of copyright infringement. The 
ground for this claim was that Veoh allowed customers to upload 
copyright-protected video files via its Internet-based video network.10 
UMG later made secondary liability claims against Veoh’s investors, 
who were also shareholders and collectively controlled a majority of 
Veoh’s board seats, for facilitating this infringing technology by 
providing financial and management support.11
The court granted the investor defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
case.
 
12 In doing so, the court held that, based on the facts pled by 
plaintiff, the investors did not provide sufficient material assistance to 
support a claim of contributory copyright infringement.13 The court 
also found that the investors lacked sufficient financial interest in the 
infringing activities to support a claim of vicarious copyright 
infringement.14
                                                                                                             
9 Id. 
 The district court distinguished several cases that 
previously set the boundaries of secondary copyright infringement 
10 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1100 
(C.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2009). 
11 Id. at *6. 
12 Id. at *6. 
13 Id. at *3. 
14 Id. at *5. 
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liability. The court provided UMG an opportunity to amend its 
complaint, although it discouraged it from doing so, in part, because 
the claims could raise “vexing issues of corporate governance.”15 
UMG amended the complaint, but the district court dismissed it with 
prejudice.16 The district court’s dismissal of the claims in Veoh is on 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit and a decision is expected within the 
year.17
The liability boundaries for investors in companies found to have 
infringed copyrights will almost certainly continue to develop. 
However, at least for the time being, the Veoh analysis may be 
instructive for those seeking to predict future developments in 
secondary copyright infringement liability. 
  
 
II. CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY REQUIRES ACTION TO EFFECT 
INFRINGEMENT 
 
In Veoh, the subscribers allegedly committed direct copyright 
infringement by uploading copyrighted television shows onto the 
Veoh network. Veoh itself was sued for contributory infringement but 
successfully asserted that it was protected by section 512(c) of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.18
“The theory of contributory liability generally permits direct 




                                                                                                             
15 Id. at *6. 
 These principals need not necessarily exercise dominion 
over the primary tortfeasor or criminal. However, generally, they 
16 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-56777 
(9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2009). 
17 Id.; Brief of Appellants, UMG Recordings, Inc., v. Shelter Capital Partners, 
LLC, No. 09-55092, 2010 WL 3708623 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2010); Consolidated 
Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, UMG v. Shelter Capital Partners, No. 
09-55092, 2010 WL 3708628 (9th Cir. Jun 3, 2010); Reply Brief of Appellants, 
UMG v. Shelter Capital Partners, No. 09-55092, 2010 WL 3708631 (9th Cir. Jul 
15, 2010). 
18 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F.Supp.2d 1099 (C.D. 
Cal. Sep 11, 2009). This decision of the District Court is on appeal as well, and has 
been consolidated with the appeal, see supra note 16, against the investors. 
19 David R. Plane, Going After the Middleman: Landlord Liability in the Battle 
Against Counterfeits, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 810, 817 (2009). 
5
Proctor: "Capital" Punishment: Evaluating an Investor's Secondary Copyrigh
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
222 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 6:3 
must know (or, as the court in Veoh framed it, have “reason to 
know”) about the infringing activity and must provide material 
assistance to the infringer.20 Courts finding sufficient knowledge and 
contribution can find the principal jointly and severally liable with the 
primary tortfeasor.21
The Veoh court found that, although UMG sufficiently claimed 
that the investor defendants knew of Veoh’s infringement, it failed to 
state a claim that the investors provided material assistance to the 
primary infringers.
 
22 A number of findings supported this holding, 
the most important being that the Veoh investors merely exercised 
“plain vanilla” control characteristic of board members rather than 
actual control over the infringing activity. Indeed, some examples of 
control pled by plaintiff were fairly generic (e.g., the hiring of 
employees and determining what content should be carried on the 
Veoh network).23 However, other examples of control related more 
closely to the infringing conduct (e.g., approving the launch of 
software that facilitated uploading and deciding not to employ filters 
to identify copyrighted content).24 The court rejected UMG’s claim 
that holding board meetings at an investor-stockholder’s office 
constituted control on the ground that such action, in itself, was 
normal director behavior.25 There was also no claim that the board 
appointees were merely puppets of the investors.26
Prior to Veoh, the leading case on investor liability for copyright 
infringement was UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG.
 
27
                                                                                                             
20 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM, 
2009 WL 334022, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009) (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-22 (9th Cir. 2001)); Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795; 
6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:41 (“[T]he essence of 
contributory infringement is knowledge of the infringing conduct and facilitating 
the means by which the direct infringement is accomplished.”). 
 The 
Bertelsmann case involved a lawsuit for copyright infringement 
21 See, e.g., Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 
F.Supp. 399, 404-405 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
22 Veoh, 2009 WL 334022, at *3 
23 Id. at *1. 
24 Id. at *2. 
25 Id. at *4. 
26 Id. 
27 UMG Recording, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 412-413 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004). 
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damages against an investor in Napster, an online music file-sharing 
service. The direct infringement was committed by the company, 
which maintained a library of infringing music uploaded by users. 
Bertelsmann held that the investor-defendant (Bertelsmann AG) 
incurred contributory liability for Napster’s copyright infringement. 
The Veoh court made several distinctions with Bertelsmann in 
determining that UMG’s contributory infringement claims were 
insufficiently pled. First, unlike Veoh, the Bertelsmann plaintiff 
complained that Napster’s investor knew about the infringing activity 
before it invested in Napster.28 In addition, one of the plaintiffs in 
Bertelsmann claimed that Bertelsmann’s management, not just its 
board appointees, caused Napster to engage in infringement.29 Also, 
the Bertelsmann plaintiff accused the defendants of specifically 
ordering “such activity [to] take place,” rather than merely knowing 
of it, as was the case in Veoh.30 Finally, Bertelsmann was Napster’s 
only available source of funding, a fact not pled in Veoh. Thus, 
Bertelsmann was assumed to have the absolute power to stop 
Napster’s infringement by withholding funds.31
Based on Bertelsmann and Veoh, actions an investor may 
undertake without incurring liability for contributory infringement 
include those categorized as routine day-to-day management of the 
investment target, provided that the investor does not direct the 
continuance of activities that are known to be infringing. However, to 
preclude secondary copyright infringement on any other theory, the 
investor must also be mindful of vicarious liability and inducement to 
infringe claims, as discussed below. 
 
 
III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY REQUIRES DIRECT FINANCIAL INTEREST 
AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL 
 
In general, under the principle of vicarious liability in tort, courts 
can hold an investor strictly liable to a third party for the acts of the 
                                                                                                             
28 Veoh, 2009 WL 334022, at *4. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. See also UMG Recording, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 412-
413 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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primary tortfeasor.32 Vicarious liability grew out of the agency 
doctrine of respondeat superior,33 which holds a principal liable for 
its agent’s wrongful acts committed within the scope of the agency.34 
In general, courts will hold an investor liable to a third party for the 
acts of the primary tortfeasor. Under the theory of vicarious liability, 
courts may find a person strictly liable for a second person’s torts 
“simply because there is a relationship between the two people and 
the second person was acting within the scope of that relationship 
when he committed the tort.”35
Factors influencing a finding of liability for vicarious infringe-
ment of copyrights include the investor’s right and ability to super-
vise the infringing activity and its direct financial interest in such 
activities.
 
36 Unlike contributory liability, the court need not find that 
the investor had knowledge of the specific infringement in order to 
establish vicarious liability.37
The Veoh court determined that UMG failed to sufficiently state a 
claim of vicarious copyright infringement liability. It did not consider 
allegations regarding Veoh’s investors’ ability to supervise Veoh’s 
infringing conduct because the investors had an insufficient direct 
financial interest in the infringement to be held vicariously liable. In 
particular, the plaintiff in Veoh did not claim investors received fees 
 
                                                                                                             
32 Andrew J. Lee, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. & In Re Aimster 
Litigation: A Study of Secondary Copyright Liability in the Peer-To-Peer Context, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485, 487 (2005). 
33 Id. 
34 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 12.04. 
35 See Thomas B. Foley, Show Me The Money!: Third-Party Copyright Infrin-
gement Liability Reaches Investors & Lenders, 38 SW. U. L. REV. 89, 93 (2008). 
36 E.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Lobster Pot Inc., 582 F.Supp. 478, 482 (N.D. 
Ohio 1984) (citing Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and 
Breeding Ass’n, Inc., 554 F.2d 1213, 1215 (1st Cir. 1977)). See also Grokster, 545 
U.S. at 914; Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1163 (2d Cir. 1971); Shapiro, Bernstein & Company v. H.L. Green Company, 316 
F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); 6 PATRY, supra note 20, at § 21:41 (“The essence of 
vicarious liability is the right to control the infringing conduct and derivation of a 
financial benefit from that conduct.”).  
37 Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d at 1162 (one 
who promotes or induces the infringing acts of a performer need have no actual 
knowledge of copyright monopoly impairment in order to be held jointly and 
severally liable as a “vicarious” infringer). 
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from customers or advertisers, or dividends or distributions from 
Veoh. 38 Instead, UMG alleged that infringement “attract[ed] users 
and advertising dollars to Veoh, and increase[d] the value of [the 
investors’] financial interests . . . [and] profit . . . through the sale of 
Veoh . . . [or] public offering.”39 The Court concluded that the 
investors’ financial benefit was too far removed from the alleged 
infringement to be considered a “direct” financial interest.40 Merely 
having an objective of increasing ownership value is neither 
sufficiently invidious nor of sufficiently “direct” benefit to make an 
investor secondarily liable for copyright infringement.41
The Veoh court distinguished three leading cases on vicarious 
infringement. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auctions, Inc.
 
42 and A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc.,43 where liability was found, and Ellison 
v. Robertson,44
In Fonovisa, the plaintiff sued a flea market operator for 
facilitating copyright infringement through “swap meet” style sales of 
musical recordings.
 where it was not. As none of these cases involved 
investors in the classic sense, their holdings are only analogous.  
45 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision to dismiss the suit and held the complaint sufficiently 
alleged vicarious copyright infringement arising from the sale of 
pirated music by vendors. The defendant derived substantive benefit 
from vendor rental fees, customer admissions fees, and revenues from 
supporting services.46 The court of appeals also found that the 
defendant financially benefitted from the infringement because the 
availability of pirated recordings “drew” customers, thereby 
increasing defendant's revenues.47
In Napster, eighteen record companies sued to enjoin Napster 
 
                                                                                                             
38 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM, 2009 




42 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
43 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
44 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). 
45 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261. 
46 Id. at 263. 
47 Id. 
9
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from offering its file-sharing technology to its subscribers.48 The 
plaintiffs based their lawsuit on the ground that customers were using 
Napster’s technology to commit copyright infringement.49 The court 
granted a preliminary injunction until Napster took action to prevent 
future infringement.50 The Ninth Circuit held Napster liable for 
vicarious copyright infringement, finding “ample evidence . . . that 
Napster’s future revenue is directly dependent upon ‘increases in 
userbase.’ More users register with the Napster system as the ‘quality 
and quantity of available music increases.’”51
Ellison involved an appeal of summary judgment dismissing a 
copyright infringement lawsuit filed by an author.
 
52 The suit claimed 
that an individual, the alleged direct infringer, had posted a copy of 
the plaintiff’s copyrighted works on a peer-to-peer file-sharing 
network.53 The suit also alleged that the Internet service provider, 
America Online (“AOL”), was vicariously liable for copyright 
infringement due to the direct financial benefit it received because of 
the defendant's actions.54 The Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of 
plaintiff Ellison’s liability claim against AOL.55 As to AOL, the court 
found no proof that it benefitted financially from attracting sub-
scribers who infringed copyrights or failing to obstruct subscriber 
infringement.56
The Veoh holding suggests that establishing investor liability for 
vicarious infringement requires more than merely proving an 
investment objective. Instead, plaintiffs need to demonstrate that the 
investors derived direct financial benefit from the infringement itself. 
 
                                                                                                             
48 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 
2000). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 927.  
51 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (“The existence of a large user base that increases daily and can be 
“monetized” makes Napster, Inc. a potentially attractive acquisition for larger, more 
established firms.”)). 
52 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1079. 
56 Id. 
10
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Veoh did not demonstrate the latter, as the “ability to supervise” 
prong of the vicarious liability test was not considered by the court 
because it found no direct financial benefit. Investors must also be 
vigilant to avoid the third type of secondary copyright infringement 
liability, namely, inducement of copyright infringement. 
 
IV. INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY REQUIRES INDUCEMENT VIA PRODUCT 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
Liability for inducement to infringe copyright requires distri-
bution of a product “necessary for the infringement to occur.”57 As 
the Veoh court stated it, “Inducement to infringe copyright requires 
distribution of a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement.”58
Veoh did not analyze criteria for determining when investing in a 
company distributing a service, such as an Internet TV network, 
rather than a product, would result in secondary liability for infringe-
ment under an inducement theory. This was because Veoh found the 
allegations of the complaint insufficient to assert encouragement of 
infringement in connection with the distribution of such services. 
However, prior to financing file-transfer technology, investors should 
consider potential legal ramifications of distributing copyrighted 
material via these media as they have already been considered 
susceptible to inducement to infringe claims.
  
59
In In re Aimster Copyright Litigation (“Aimster”),
 
60 the Northern 
District of Illinois assumed that the provision of file-sharing software 
and a downloading service could form the basis of an inducement to 
infringement claim. Aimster was found liable for secondary copyright 
infringement.61
                                                                                                             
57 Foley, supra note 35, at 102 (quoting 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON 
COPYRIGHT § 8:10 (3d ed. 2008)). 
 Specifically, by advertising that clicking on a “play” 
58 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM, 2009 
WL 334022, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009). 
59 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
942 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 653 (N.D. Ill. 
2002). 
60 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
61 Id. at 652. 
11
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button would prompt the software to automatically create a 
connection between users’ computers to facilitate finding, copying, 
and distributing copyrighted files, Aimster created a “road map” for 
its customers to commit copyright infringement.62 However, excep-
tions have been made for products widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes, or capable of substantial non-infringing 
uses.63 For example, although people can use a videocassette recorder 
to illegally copy and distribute a copyrighted movie, they are much 
more likely to use it to “time shift”, that is, to record the movie for 
later personal viewing.64 Aimster did not have substantial non-
infringing uses and, in any event, the “substantial non-infringing use” 
defense was found inapplicable to services involving an ongoing 
relationship.65
In its rather brief analysis of liability for inducement to infringe 
copyright, the Veoh Court cited the latest United States Supreme 
Court decision on inducement to infringe, MGM Studios v. 
Grokster.
 
66 In Grokster, artists, music publishers, and movie studios 
sued the distributors of peer-to-peer file sharing software for 
copyright infringement inducement.67 The Supreme Court, in finding 
the defendant liable for inducement to infringe copyright, held that 
“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of 
infringement by third parties.”68 The Veoh Court distinguished 
Groskter by finding that UMG did not claim the investors 




                                                                                                             
62 Id. 
63 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984).  
64 Id. at 443. 
65 Aimster, 252 F.Supp. 2d at 653. 
66 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM, 2009 
WL 334022, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009). 
67 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913. 
68 Id. at 936-37. 
69 Veoh, 2009 WL 334022, at *6. 
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V. IMPACT OF VEOH: INVESTORS NOT PER SE LIABLE, BUT DUE 
DILIGENCE STILL ESSENTIAL 
 
The development of secondary copyright infringement law has 
historically favored the rights of copyright holders. Investors, 
therefore, face the risk of being held liable for the infringing activities 
of their target companies. This risk creates a potential chilling effect 
on capital investment.70
Veoh provides some comfort to investors considering providing 
funds to high-technology companies. Nevertheless, issues related to 
secondary liability remain unresolved by Veoh. First, because the 
court found UMG’s direct financial interest insufficient, it bypassed 
the “ability to supervise” prong of the vicarious liability test.
 
71
Yet, even though Veoh does not resolve all issues of secondary 
liability, it still provides several important lessons for investors. 
Investors should carefully assess their potential exposure to liability 
for the infringing actions of their investment targets. Courts strive to 
support commerce and the arts by maintaining balance between 
investor and copyright holder rights when applying copyright law. 
Practitioners and investors, however, must understand that case law 
has historically favored the rights of copyright holders. 
 In 
addition, the court’s inducement to infringe analysis in Veoh was very 
cursory, making it of little use in refining the boundaries of this cause 
of action as applied to investors. As a general matter, the factors on 
which secondary liability rests involve subjective concepts such as 
“control,” “supervision,” “ability to supervise,” “reason to know,” 
“material assistance,” “encouragement of infringement,” and “direct 
financial interest,” which seem bound to lead to contrary results on 
similar facts. All of this foreshadows additional showdowns between 
investors and copyright advocates looking to improve their respective 
rights.  
Prospective investors should obtain a “warranty of no knowledge” 
                                                                                                             
70 Foley, supra note 35 at 92. See also 6 PATRY, supra note 20, at § 21:48.50 
(stating that holding investors liable for copyright infringement for merely 
providing financial assistance “gives a tool of evil to those who need no further 
such further tools in their unshakable thirst for crushing innovation, competition, 
and consumers.”). 
71 Veoh, 2009 WL 334022 at *5. 
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of copyright infringement from their targets in order to minimize 
exposure to secondary liability.72
However, obtaining a “no knowledge” warranty does not relieve 
the investor of the need to thoroughly research the activities of 
investment targets.
 This warranty should include a 
statement that the target has not received copyright infringement 
complaints, or, alternatively, full disclosure of all known infringe-
ments. In addition to providing comfort as to the facts, such a 
warranty may be useful to the investor in defending against a 
secondary infringement claim. Specifically, the absence of infringe-
ments mentioned in the warranty could be cited to defeat the 
knowledge prong of contributory infringement.  
73
The final lesson is that investors should remain vigilant to avoid 
any conduct on their part after investment that could be causally 
linked to copyright infringement. Examples of such actions include 
specifically ordering infringing activity to take place
 As a practical matter, infringements could still 
exist without knowledge and be the source of vicarious liability, 
where knowledge is not an issue. More significantly, the entity 
making the representation may be poorly capitalized and unable to 
compensate the investor for the damages resulting from infringement 
claims. 
74 or the failure 
of the investor to use its operational control (to the extent it has it) to 
order stoppage of copyright infringement once made aware of it.75
In sum, Veoh and analogous cases expose the infringement 
liability risks of investing in firms providing high-technology services 
or products. The fact that the investors were found not liable in Veoh 
is encouraging to investors hoping to avoid secondary liability for 
making such investments. However, because of the prohibitive 
penalties for copyright infringement (not to mention the potential for 
loss of the investment if the infringing conduct is enjoined), the 
dearth of cases, and the lack of clear guidelines, caution is still 
 
                                                                                                             
72 Foley, supra note 35 at 129. 
73 Id. (“Any such guarantee by the financing target should also be coupled with 
the financier's own due diligence. Financiers rely on others' due diligence at their 
own detriment.”). 
74 UMG Recording, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 413 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
75 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001)  
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advisable. Investors should perform thorough due diligence before 
and after making a capital investment in high-technology companies. 
The practice pointers following this Article provide suggestions for 
legal practitioners advising investors looking to anticipate and limit 




The Veoh court has demonstrated that the standards for 
determining secondary copyright infringement liability are still far 
from settled. Investing in an infringing company and controlling its 
overall operations are not, in and of themselves, sufficient grounds 
for derivative liability. The absence of knowledge (or reason to 
know) of the infringing activity protects against liability for 
contributory infringement, but not vicarious infringement if there is a 
direct financial benefit derived from the infringement. To distill it 
down conceptually, the plaintiff must establish sufficient causation 
between the infringing activity and the investor’s financial benefit 
and operational control. In making such determinations, courts strive 




 Perform due diligence to determine current and potential uses of 
the target company’s technology. This effort should include the 
compilation and review of documents held by the company 
providing permission to use copyrighted works of third parties. 
Where due diligence does not provide clear answers about 
infringement, consider the company’s potential value without the 
arguably infringing elements, should they be enjoined or 
discontinued, before making the investment. 
 Negotiate for a warranty and representation from the investment 
target company that, to the target’s knowledge, no third party is 
using the target’s technology to infringe copyrights. In addition, 
the target should warrant and represent that it has not received 
complaints from copyright holders or, if the company has 
received complaints—or will receive such complaints in the 
future—it must disclose germane information to the investor by 
giving proper notice. 
15
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 Obtain indemnification from the target against all losses resulting 
from any third-party copyright infringement claims arising from 
use of the target’s technology. Note, however, that indemnity is 
only as good as the capitalization of the entity providing it; if the 
indemnity would merely come out of one pocket and go into 
another—with respect to equity investors—then investigate 
whether insurance is an option. 
 Be mindful that if the returns on the investment are paid directly 
out of revenues, and the revenues are heavily influenced by 
infringing activities, then the risk of liability for vicarious 
infringement appears somewhat greater than if the return on 
investment will come from the ultimate appreciation of the 
equity. 
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